Passwords and Tokens and Humans, Oh My!

Usability and user acceptance of FIDO U2F tokens

Topics

- Motivation
- Background
 - Authentication factors
 - Token types
- Our Study
 - Methods
 - Findings
- Future Work

Motivation

• Passwords stink

- Hard to remember
- Hard to type
- Easy to guess
- Easy to steal
- Easy to share
- Etc., etc.
- We still use them



Motivation (2)





Alternatives exist

- Biometrics
- One-time passwords
- Preference profiles
- Plenty of weirder ideas
- Not widely used
 - Why?

Background: Authentication Factors

Something you

- Know
 - Password/phrase
 - "security question"
 - Secret key
- Are
 - Fingerprint
 - Iris patern
 - Gait

- Have
 - Key
 - Phone
 - Hardware token

Background: One-Time Passwords

Prove posession of

- Phone
 - SMS
 - "Soft" token & key
- Hardware Token
 - Tamper-resistant hardware
 - Embedded key
- Standards
 - TOTP, HOTP



Background: Deployment

• Easy front-end

- One password box
- Everyone has a keyboard
- Easy-ish backend
 - RADIUS



• Obnoxious user experience

- Must carry token
- Must transcribe code
- Often no backup permitted
- Token proliferation
- Users find 2X utility to avoid

Background: FIDO U2F



Introduced in 2012

- Advantages
 - One token across all sites
 - Mutual authentication
 - Backup tokens

"We fail if FIDO is not more usable than all the other (hardware token) options you have used before"

– Brett Mcdowell

• Disadvantages

- New protocol
- Needs client support
- Needs server support



Let's give these to a bunch of undergrads and see what happens!

Two Phases



What we did:

- Two-phase study
 - Same procedures
 - A year apart
- Some changes between
 - Validated some recommendations
- Two cases
 - Google instructions
 - Yubico instructions

• Expertise survey

• Previously validated

Think-aloud observation

- Gave keys to undergrads
- Asked them to set up
- Tried not to help
 - (or laugh)
- Follow-up survey

Phase I participants

- 20 male students, and 7 female students
- Six were between 18 and 20
- Sixteen were between 21 and 23
- Four were 24-26
- One was over 30
- Mean security expertise was 2.96 of 5
- Mean computing expertise was 4.34

of 5

Phase II participants

- 27 male students, and 8 female
 - students
- One were between 18 and 20
- Twenty Nine were between 21 and 23
- Two were 24-26
- One was over 30
- Mean security expertise was 2.95 of 5
- Mean computing expertise was 4.22 of 5

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Recommendations – Phase I

- Finding instructions
- Demo versus reality
- Device identification
- Biometric versus touch
- Confirmation of operation
- Communicate the benefit
- Communicating the risks

Recommendations – Phase II

- Finding instructions
- Demo versus reality
- Correctly identifying the device
- Biometric versus touch
- Confirmation of operation
- Communicate the Benefit
- Communicating the risk

Future work

Range of tokens

- Other hard tokens
- Soft tokens
- Different population
 - Dad?
 - Coworkers?
 - "normal" undergrads?
- Value communication

• Forthcoming standards

- More general extension of U2F ideas
- Extra metadata options
 - Cool soft token possibilities
- Collaboration with Red Hat
 - Nathaniel McCallum and FreeOTP





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https://www.sice.indiana.edu/all-people/profile.html?profile_id=178



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Questions?

Presented at Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2018 Full paper at http://fc18.ifca.ai/preproceedings/111.pdf